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Introduction
Dallas is in the midst of  a financial crisis. The city’s public pension debt has doubled in less than 
two years due to inadequate funding, irresponsible benefit enhancements, and poor investment 
decisions. The total unfunded liability is now at least $4 billion—and the plans do not have 
enough money to pay for nearly half  of  the retirement benefits workers have already earned. 
The problems with the city’s largest pension fund, the Dallas Police and Fire Pension System, 
are particularly acute. The plan, which is supposed to protect the retirement security of  law 
enforcement officers and first responders, is nearly bankrupt and could run out of  cash for 
benefit payments in the near future. 
The most immediate issue is the recent “run on the bank.” In the past six months, police officers 
and firefighters have withdrawn hundreds of  millions of  dollars in savings from the Deferred 
Retirement Option Program (DROP), a savings account provided to members of  the police and 
fire fund when they reach retirement eligibility. There are urgent problems with DROP, but it 
won’t be enough to focus on those issues alone. 
The city must also address a number of  underlying structural flaws in order to improve the 
pension system’s financial stability and protect workers and taxpayers. These problems include 
the police and fire fund’s broken governance structure, inadequate funding, and misguided 
investment practices. 
One egregious example of  how the plan has been mismanaged is the reckless decisions made 
by the police and fire fund’s former leadership, who invested more than half  of  its assets in real 
estate, including high-risk properties such as luxury homes in Hawaii and a resort and vineyard 
in Napa, California. The city made less than it expected on these investments, which led to a 
nearly $1 billion investment shortfall, hundreds of  millions of  dollars in asset devaluations, and a 
reported Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI) review. 
The issues facing the police and fire fund alone present a serious threat to the city’s fiscal health. 
However, these problems have been compounded by the fact that the Employees’ Retirement 
Fund is also facing funding challenges. The plan, which serves municipal workers, holds more 
than $900 million in debt. Recently, it has failed to meet its investment return targets, and the city 
has not paid enough into the system to make up the difference, which has caused the unfunded 
liability to grow. 
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Now faced with the question of  how to deal with ballooning pension costs, there are few 
options. The city’s pension debt is already more than three times the general fund revenue, and 
the only way to balance the books will be to raise taxes, freeze or reduce wages and benefits for 
public workers, or cut programs and services.
It is clear that Dallas is in serious financial trouble. The city is at a tipping point. If  local leaders 
do not take immediate steps to address the problem, there could be disastrous consequences. 
Although there are solutions that can help to put the city on a path to financial sustainability, 
officials don’t have the tools they need to negotiate changes to the police and fire plan at the 
local level. The plan, like 12 other pension funds in Texas, is under the control of  the state 
legislature. This creates problematic delays and means that elected representatives who may 
know little about the city’s finances are making decisions that have a significant impact on those 
who live and work in the community. 
In order to truly fix the pension problems, city leaders must obtain local control of  the police 
and fire fund, take steps to stabilize DROP, and develop a plan to pay down the pension debt 
held by both plans. The crisis in Dallas should serve as a warning to cities across Texas, especially 
those with plans under state control, including Fort Worth, Houston, San Antonio, Austin, and 
El Paso. In a short time, Dallas’ fiscal health has taken a serious turn for the worse, and dedicated 
public servants and taxpayers are likely to pay a hefty price.
The city is at a tipping point. If  local leaders do not take 
immediate steps to address the problem, there could be 
disastrous consequences.
3www.arnoldfoundation.org
Although the municipal employees’ retirement plan is nearly $1 billion in debt, the largest threat 
to the city’s finances is the significant funding challenges facing the police and fire pension fund. 
In 2014, the Dallas police and fire plan reported that it was more than 75 percent funded, but 
just two years later, the funded ratio plummeted to 45 percent. Without meaningful reforms, the 
plan is projected to run out of  money in 15 years or less.
The acute funding issues can be traced back to several factors, including a series of  bad 
investments made by the plan’s former leadership. The former plan administrator, Richard 
Tettamant, transferred more than 50 percent of  the portfolio into hard-to-value private equity 
and real estate investments in an effort to earn high returns. The big bets on Hawaiian estates, a 
California resort and vineyard, an infamous Dallas skyscraper known as the Museum Tower, and 
other properties failed to pay off. While other financial funds made double-digit gains during the 
bull market that followed the Great Recession, the police and fire plan posted average returns 
that were nearly a percentage point below its expected rate of  return of  7.25 percent.
In 2011, as the plan began to rack up debt from its investment shortfalls, officials at the Nasher 
Sculpture Center noticed that a reflective glare from the nearby Museum Tower was causing 
damage to the center’s sculpture garden. A protracted debate between the pension board and 
representatives of  the center about how to fix the problem followed—often playing out in 
reports published by the local media. 
History of  the Police and Fire Fund
Dallas Pension Plans $4,225 58.2% 100.0% $220 $168 76.3%
Employees’ Retirement Fund 
of  the City of  Dallas $935 77.4% 22.1% $65 $51 78.5%
Dallas Police and Fire 
Pension System – Combined $3,267 45.1% 77.3% $153 $115 74.9%
Dallas Police and Fire 
Pension System – Supplemental $23 45.8% 0.5% $2 $2 100.0%
Table 1. By 2015, Dallas’ Pension Plans Faced Serious Funding Challenges
Plan
Share of  
Total 
Shortfall
ADC* 
(in Millions)
Actual 
Contribution 
(in Millions)
Percent of  
ADC 
Contributed
Dallas General Fund 
Revenue $1,150 Million
Source: Authors’ calculations; Employees’ Retirement Fund and Police and Fire Pension System 
comprehensive annual financial reports; Employees’ Retirement Fund and Police and Fire 
Pension System actuarial valuation reports; and “Guide to Public Retirement Systems in Texas” 
by the Texas Pension Review Board. *Actuarially Determined Contribution (ADC).
Funded 
Ratio
Pension 
Debt
(in Millions)
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The public dispute led to increased scrutiny of  the plan by local and city officials. Investigative 
media reports soon revealed that members of  the fund’s board and employees spent nearly 
$1 million on trips to Europe, the United Arab Emirates, and other places. News outlets also 
reported that the fund launched a fake social media campaign to make it appear as if  the public 
supported the Museum Tower in the argument over the glare. 
Local leaders launched their own inquiry into the fund’s investments, but it took several years to 
uncover the true extent of  the plan’s underfunding, given that the city did not have local control 
of  its own pension fund and therefore had limited information about the plan managers’ actions. 
After the pension board voted to remove Tettamant in 2014, the plan’s new managers conducted 
an extensive review of  its portfolio. They found that the former leadership had overvalued 
the fund’s assets and used accounting gimmicks to hide millions of  dollars in debt. The review 
resulted in hundreds of  millions of  dollars in write-downs of  its real estate holdings, which drew 
the attention of  federal investigators. Earlier this year, the FBI raided the offices of  the former 
outside advisory firm, investigating “multiple breaches” of  fiduciary responsibilities.1  
At the same time that the former plan managers’ alleged misconduct came to light, it also 
became clear that the plan had failed to account for several cost drivers when calculating the 
amount the city should pay into the pension system. In other words, although Dallas made
Source: Authors’ calculations; Employees’ Retirement Fund and Police and Fire Pension System comprehensive annual financial reports; Employees’ 
Retirement Fund and Police and Fire Pension System actuarial valuation reports; “Guide to Public Retirement Systems in Texas” by the Texas 
Pension Review Board; and Bureau of  Labor Statistics. Note: Adjusted for inflation.
1 Michael Granberry. (Sept. 25, 2016). “Fights, fantasy fixes and the FBI: Museum Tower and Nasher still at odds over glare after five 
   years.” Dallas Morning News. Retrieved from http://www.dallasnews.com/arts/museums/2016/09/25/fights-fantasy-fixes-fbi-
   museum-tower-nasher-still-odds-glare-five-years
Graph 1. Dallas’ Pension Debt Doubled Between 2013 and 2015
Liabilities
Assets
Pension Debt
$10.1 Billion
$5.9 Billion
$4.2 Billion
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payments to the police and fire fund, its contributions were not enough to cover the true cost of
workers’ benefits and the plan’s debt. This further exacerbated the problems caused by its 
investment shortfalls. 
The most significant miscalculation was that DROP, which was created to help the police 
and fire departments retain experienced employees, proved to be much more expensive than 
officials originally anticipated. The program is intended to be an incentive for experienced 
employees to keep them in the workforce and offers workers who are eligible to retire a 
guaranteed investment return in exchange for deferring their pension benefits. Employees can 
choose to withdraw their savings immediately upon retirement or leave them in the fund in 
perpetuity. When an employee does withdraw the funds in his or her account, the savings and 
guaranteed investment returns are paid out as a lump sum in addition to the individual’s monthly 
annuity benefit. 
These types of  accounts can be sustainable if  designed properly. However, the program in Dallas 
became a serious financial liability after several significant enhancements were made. During 
the late 1990s, the plan increased its guaranteed interest rates, setting levels between 8 and 10 
percent, and expanded eligibility requirements. Then in 2001, members of  the police and fire 
plan made further amendments to the investment rate provision by tying the rate to the 10-year 
average of  the police and fire pension system’s returns. State statute allows the members to 
unilaterally increase benefits through a two-thirds majority vote, and the members were able to 
make these changes without the approval of  city officials or taxpayers.  
The result was that returns remained high even during years in which the market did not 
perform well. This created significant problems during the Great Recession, when plan members 
kept earning returns of  9.75 and 10 percent based on the fund’s prior strong performance. The 
guaranteed interest rate and the pension plan’s actual returns have continued to diverge in recent 
years, which has put the fund even deeper in the hole. 
The grave miscalculations regarding the police and fire plan’s governance, funding, and 
investment policies are now threatening its financial stability. Amid concerns about the fund’s 
solvency and potential changes that would make it more difficult for retirees to access their 
DROP balances, public safety workers have withdrawn or requested more than $300 million 
from DROP accounts in the last several months. 
More than 50 percent of  the plan’s total remaining assets are attributable to DROP accounts. 
Given that the plan is severely underfunded and a considerable amount of  its other capital is 
invested in illiquid assets such as real estate and private equity funds, it could face a severe cash-
flow problem in the near future if  the run continues.
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While Dallas must take immediate steps to stabilize DROP, much more is needed to address the 
police and fire fund’s underlying issues. In particular, there are two structural problems that will 
cause the debt to continue to grow.  
First, as the plan’s funded ratio decreased over the past few years, Dallas’ actuarially determined 
contribution—or the amount that is needed to pay down the debt and cover benefits for current 
employees—has skyrocketed to an unprecedented 79 percent of  payroll. However, state statute 
caps the city’s contribution level at 28.5 percent of  payroll, which is less than half  of  what it 
should now be paying given the enormous unfunded liability. If  Dallas keeps failing to make 
adequate payments into the pension system, the debt will increase dramatically. 
Second, the debt will balloon if  the plan misses its investment targets and the city fails to make 
up the difference. This is important to consider given that the police and fire fund’s expected rate 
of  return is almost three times greater than the risk-free rate of  return. In other words, Dallas is 
betting on returns it is very unlikely to achieve. 
If  Dallas keeps failing to make adequate payments into 
the pension system, the debt will increase dramatically.
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The Current Situation 
Even under the best-case scenario, Dallas’ pension debt will have serious consequences for 
workers and taxpayers. Put simply, rising pension costs will affect the city’s ability to recruit 
and retain workers and provide public services. It could also undercut the region’s long-term 
economic growth. Dallas will have less money to devote to police and fire departments, libraries, 
parks, and other programs. There will be less discretionary funding to invest in infrastructure 
improvements that could help to attract new residents and employers. And it will be more 
difficult for the city to put money aside in order to weather economic downturns or to deal with 
financial emergencies. 
The budget crunch also presents a considerable risk to the city’s other pension plan, the 
Employees’ Retirement Fund, which currently holds more than $900 million in pension debt and 
is only 77 percent funded. Although the plan is in a better financial position than the police and 
fire fund, it faces many of  the same structural problems. 
Between 2010 and 2015, Dallas contributed at least $74 million less than the amount it needed 
to pay in order to maintain the fiscal health of  the employees’ fund. Like making the minimum 
payments on a credit card, this only means that it will cost much more to pay off  the debt in 
the long run. Indeed, during the same period, the city’s actuarially determined contributions 
nearly doubled. 
The underfunding, coupled with the fact that the fund is banking on investment returns of  
8 percent, a figure that it is unlikely to achieve over either the short or long term, have put 
the employees’ plan on shaky ground. Without reform, the debt is projected to grow, placing 
municipal workers’ retirement security at risk. 
The bottom line is that the pension debt held by both the employees’ plan and the police and 
fire fund will impact the city for years to come. Left with few options to balance the budget and 
cover rising pension costs, taxpayers could face tax hikes, while police officers, firefighters, and 
other public servants could face wage and benefit reductions. 
Left with few options to balance the budget and cover 
rising pension costs, taxpayers could face tax hikes, while
police officers, firefighters, and other public servants
could face wage and benefit reductions.
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Indeed, police and fire pension plan officials are considering requesting a $1 billion cash payment 
from the city, which would require Dallas to raise taxes or cut services.2 Members of  both 
pension plans may also face benefit cuts. Administrators of  the employees’ plan have proposed 
capping annual Cost of  Living Adjustments, increasing the age at which members reach 
retirement eligibility, and reducing benefit levels for new employees. 
Members of  the police and fire fund are considering changes that would increase the amount 
they contribute to pensions, cap annual Cost of  Living Adjustments, reduce the guaranteed 
interest rate offered to DROP members, and limit the amount of  time workers can participate in 
DROP to 10 years. However, these changes alone will not be enough to solve the problems with 
the police and fire plan, and the plan’s actuaries estimate that the changes will only push back, by 
a few years, the date at which it is expected to run out of  money. 
Dallas cannot afford to make incremental fixes, especially given that the pension debt is 
already causing serious problems. At a recent public meeting, the police and fire pension board 
announced that it will seek more than $36 million from the city to cover its operations costs. The 
request came as Fitch Ratings and Moody’s Investors Service downgraded the city’s credit rating 
for the second year in a row, citing the pension debt as the primary reason for the downgrades.
Graph 2. Pension Debt is 3.5 Times Greater than General Fund Revenue
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Source: Authors’ calculations; Employees’ Retirement Fund and Police and Fire Pension System comprehensive annual financial reports; 
Employees’ Retirement Fund and Police and Fire Pension System actuarial valuation reports; and “Guide to Public Retirement Systems in 
Texas” by the Texas Pension Review Board.
2 Tristan Hallman. (Oct. 21, 2016). “Dallas Police and Fire Pension benefit cuts will only be the beginning of  solution for ‘big, hairy 
   mess.’” Dallas Morning News. http://www.dallasnews.com/news/news/2016/10/20/dallas-police-fire-pension-benefit-cuts-will-
   beginning-solution-big-hairy-mess
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While the issues in Dallas would be challenging for any city, they come at a particularly difficult 
time for the local community after the tragic July shooting in which five local law enforcement 
officers lost their lives. As the city seeks to identify ways to protect its dedicated emergency 
personnel, it must take into account the fact that, left unchecked, pension debt will become a 
tremendous burden for the police and fire departments. 
Dallas has a legal and moral obligation to uphold the retirement promises made to those who 
put their lives on the line each day. It must take steps to ensure that they receive the retirement 
they deserve and have earned.
Dallas has a legal and moral obligation to uphold the 
retirement promises made to those who put their lives 
on the line each day.
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Solutions
There is no easy fix for Dallas’ pension problems. Any viable solution will require shared 
sacrifice between workers, taxpayers, and the government. Therefore, it is important that local 
leaders engage all stakeholders in developing a fair plan to pay down the pension debt and 
to create a sustainable retirement system going forward. Furthermore, any reform plan must 
address both the immediate challenges and systemic issues.
In the short term, plan managers must find a reasonable way to limit withdrawals from the 
police and fire DROP so that the fund does not experience a massive cash flow problem. 
If  withdrawals continue at the current rate or accelerate, they will affect the plan’s ability to 
make benefit payments. The pension board has yet to take meaningful action to address this 
problem and is currently relying on plan members’ goodwill to keep the fund solvent, which is 
jeopardizing workers’ retirement security. 
While stabilizing DROP is important, much more is needed to truly solve Dallas’ pension 
problems. One serious obstacle to improving the system is the fact that local leaders do not have 
all of  the tools they need to develop comprehensive, balanced reforms. Although the municipal 
employee retirement fund is codified under a city ordinance that allows local leaders to nego-
tiate directly with workers, the city’s ability to enact changes to the police and fire fund at the 
local level is limited because the plan is controlled by the state. Under this arrangement, local 
leaders must seek legislative approval to make changes to the plan, such as increasing the city’s 
contribution rate or adjusting benefits. 
In order to address the systemic flaws and prevent problems from arising again in the future, 
Dallas must obtain local control of  its police and fire plan. This would give the city the authority 
to change the plan’s governance structure and design, ensuring its long-term sustainability. The 
city would also have the flexibility it needs to respond to changing economic or demographic 
trends.  
In order to address the systemic flaws and prevent problems 
from arising again in the future, Dallas must obtain local 
control of  its police and fire plan.
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Once policymakers have local control of  the pension system, the city and plan managers must 
make fundamental reforms to its funding and investment policies so as to protect the retirement 
security of  public workers.
First, the city must adopt a better funding policy. It must make adequate funding 
non-negotiable and should commit to paying down its current unfunded liabilities in 
30 years or less. Going forward, it should commit to paying down any new debt in 
20 years or less, as recommended by the Society of  Actuaries Blue Ribbon Panel on 
Pension Funding. The city should also require that the plans use more conservative 
assumptions for calculating annual contributions to ensure that the payments cover 
the full costs of  workers’ benefits.
Second, plan managers must establish prudent investment policies that take into 
account market risk as well as the city’s ability to make up for investment shortfalls. 
These policies should also set appropriate limits on asset allocation and fees.
Third, the city should consider enrolling new workers in plans that are simpler and 
easier to manage, like a Defined Contribution or Cash Balance plan. Both types of  
plans can be designed to place workers on a path to a secure retirement while also 
protecting the city’s financial interests.
1.
2.
3.
Local leaders should also work with state legislators to ensure that other communities do not 
find themselves facing the same critical pension challenges. Texas has failed to hold its local 
governments accountable for making responsible retirement payments, and by their own 
estimates, municipal governments across the state owe $18 billion in pension debt for retirement 
benefits workers have already earned. 
This debt presents a serious financial problem that could damage the state’s long-term 
economic health. State leaders should learn from Dallas’ mistakes and enact reforms that will 
set non-negotiable minimum annual funding requirements for cities, strengthen plan reporting 
requirements, and simplify the regulatory environment for municipal plans. 
The pension challenges facing cities across Texas are urgent, but they can also be solved. City 
leaders in Dallas and in other communities, in partnership with state leaders, must take action 
now. They must the address the crisis in Dallas and the looming problems in other areas of  the 
state before they become too big to fix.
